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CASE NoTES

WATER LAW-Procedure of State Engineer in Closing Down Wells Held Contravention of Due Process. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986 (Colo.
1968).

On June 24, 1966, the division engineer notified the defendant, Fellhauer, to stop pumping and using water from
the alluvium of the Arkansas River in due regard to the fact
that there was not enough water in the river to fill the adjudicated rights of downstream users having priority dates as
early as 1887. The defendant, asserting that the 1965 act authorizing the state engineer to administer the water laws of the
state was unconsitutional, refused to comply with the order.
Action was brought on behalf of the People of the State of
Colorado by the Attorney General, as provided for in the
same act, to enjoin the defendant from pumping, with the result that an injunction issued. Thereon, Fellhauer brought an
action for review of this injunction and the proceedings upon
which it was based. The state supreme court held that in acting without any written rules or regulations and without any
prescribed guideline in shutting down the defendant's well and
38 other wells out of more than 1,600 major wells in that area,
the engineer proceeded discriminatorily in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and of the due process clause in
Article II, Section 25 of the state constitution.
The 1965 act in question reads in pertinent part that:
The state engineer or his duly authorized representative shall execute and administer the laws of the state
relative to the distribution of the surface waters of
the state including the underground waters tributary
thereto in accordance with the right of priority of appropriation, and he shall adopt such rules and regulations and issue such orders as are necessary for the
performance of the foregoing duties.' (Emphasis
supplied.)
The Fellhauer Court acknowledged the power and authority conferred upon the state engineer to administer the
laws of the state relative to its waters and specifically recognized that there may exist a legitimate and constitutional
ground and reason for the regulation of a particular well1. COLO. REv.

STAT.

§ 148-11-22(1) (Supp. 1965).
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for example, whenever a court or water adminsitration official can make a finding that the pumping of a junior well
materially injures senior appropriators who are calling generally for more water.' But the court went on to conclude that
while such delegation of authority by the legislature to the
water officials was proper, it was, nevertheless, subject to conditions. Under the decision, for the regulation of such wells
in the Arkansas Valley to be valid and constitutional three
requirements must be complied with, to-wit:
(1) The regulation must be under and in compliance
with reasonable rules, regulations, standards and a plan established by the state engineer prior to the issuance of the
regulative orders.
(2) Reasonable lessening of material injury to senior
rights must be accomplished by the regulation of the wells.
(3) If by placing conditions upon the use of a well, or
upon its owner, some or all of its water can be placed to a beneficial use by the owner without material injury to senior users,
such conditions should be made.'
The testimony of the division engineer indicated that the
action taken was based upon an oral "consensus agreement"
with certain senior appropriators, based in turn upon a
"plan" that was presented to them whereby these wells were
"distinguished out of the others." However, while he stated
that a number of factors were considered, he refused to give
the relative weight afforded to each or to show that these
evaluative factors applied to the Fellhauer well were applied
to any other. The court conceded that the engineer acted conscientiously and in good faith, but determined that even in
so doing he proceeded discriminatorily in an unsound foundation.
The chief justice of the court dissented from the majority
opinion on the ground that the engineer was merely following
procedures used in the distribution of the waters of the Arkansas River for 100 years under command of the constitution,
statutes and court decrees fixing the constitutional rights of
senior appropriators to require division engineers to stop
2. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 991 (Colo. 1968).
3. Id. at 993.
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illegal diversions of water which destroy the value of their
vested, adjudicated, prior rights. The contention that the
engineer acted "arbitrarily and capriciously" was summarily
dismissed upon the the theory that no appropriation of water
was shut down until investigation revealed that the rights of
senior appropriators compelled such action. The learned
justice also made reference to the increased complexities and
uncertainties relative to the administration of the waters of
the state to which the majority opinion will give birth.
As if by direct mandate, the Colorado legislature has recently repealed and re-enacted several statutes concerning the
power and authority of the state engineer to regulate and administer the water laws of the state. In addition, a complete
new water code has been formulated and adopted.' Although
the 1965 act referred to in Fellhaueris still in effect, it has
been refined considerably. It would appear that the intent
of the legislature was to strengthen Fellhauer,as is evidenced
by the abundance of language taken directly from the case,
utilized by the legislature, and incorporated into the 1969 act.
A reading of the legislation reveals that the three requirements' set forth by the court were integral to the policy formulation.
Section 148-11-3' of the new statutes restates the language
of the 1965 act, but at the same time qualifies it by calling for
the making of rules or regulations as a prerequisite to the performance of the engineer's duties when a law, compact, treaty,
or judicial decree or decision, "by its specific terms," requires
the same. This appears to be a direct reflection of the first
requirement enumerated, as Fellhauer,by its specific terms,
does require the implementation of such rules or regulations
prior to any action take by the engineer in shutting down wells.
The second requirement-lessening of injury to senior
rights as accomplished by the regulation of wells-may be
found within the confines of Section 148-21-17 (3) (d) 7 wherein the withdrawal of water is restricted "to the extent neces4. COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-21 (Supp. 1969). The new water code, which adds
Article 21 to the statutes, is known as the "Water Right Determination and
Administrative Act of 1969."
5. Fellhauer v. People, supra note 2, at 993.
6. COLO.REv. STAT. § 148-11-3, as amended, COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-11-3 (1969).
7. COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-21-17(3) (d) (1969).
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sary to prevent injury to senior appropriators in the order
of their priorities." Of interest particularly is the consideration of priority rights, as this was strongly suggested in the
dicta advanced by the court.'
Placing the water of a well to a beneficial use by its owner
without "material injury" to senior users, if at all possible,
was the third requirement lending itself to the constitutionality of the state engineer's procedures in regulating the waters
of the state. Section 148-21-35(2)' states:
Each division engineer shall order the total or partial discontinuance of any diversion in his division
to the extent the water being diverted is not necessary for application to a beneficial use; and he shall
also order the total or partial discontinuance of any
diversion in his division to the extent the water being
diverted is required by persons entitled to use water
under water rights having senior priorities, but no
such discontinuance shall be ordered unless the diversion is causing or will cause material injury to
such water rights having senior priorities. (Emphasis supplied.)
The legislature in this same section established a foundation upon which the state engineer is to build in constructing
a workable plan under which he will carry out his duties in
administering the water law of the state. Among the factors
to be considered are the current and prospective volumes of
water in and tributary to the stream from which the diversion
is being made; distance and type of stream bed between the
diversion points; the various velocities of this water, both surface and underground; the probable duration of the available
flow and the predictable return flow to the affected stream.' °
Taking heed of such auspice, the state engineer of Colorado did make an attempt at promulgating rules and regulations in this area of concern, but at the time of this writing
the rules had been suspended as being too rigid and therefore
8. Fellhauer v. People, supra note 2, at 997. The court stated: "Offhand, we
know of no reason why the state engineer cannot take into account the
relative priorities of wells, subject to appropriate judicial review."
9. COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-21-85(2) (1969)...
10. Id.
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unworkable," which points out the paradox of the Fellhauer
decision.
It is apparent that this formulation factor, along with its
workability factor counterpart, loom as the foremost obstacles
to the promulgation of such a plan of administration and regulation in this area of water law. The main hurdle to be crossed
is that of finding a means of accurately determining the factors listed by the court, as well as any technical factors which
the engineer might determine to be necessarily considered, so
as to arrive at a technically accurate, and, at the same time,
economically feasible modus operandi. One possible aid to
the state engineer would be an analogue model of a particular
stream and acquifier such as the Arkansas and its acquifier.
A computer would be programmed in relation to the river
and adjacent acquifier. In this way the computer could aid
in answering questions, planning courses of action, and determining such factors as the effect of a diversion upon a senior user's rights and upon the river system as a whole. Some
type of a basic formula or plan of regulation could then proceed from such technical basis, resulting in less need for discretion, and, therefore, less chance of abuse of discretion by
the engineer. More realistically, at least at the present time,
the duty to promulgate such rules and regulations or to attempt to promulgate such will fall upon the state engineer.
Compounding the problem is the fact that it is questionable
whether even a computer could successfully establish a workable plan which would include all factors relevant to its formulation due to the limitations inherent in computers and due to
the fluctuating nature of any individual water system. Perhaps this explains the latitude and the discretionary powers
bestowed upon the state engineer throughout the several states.
There may very well be no other way to effectuate the policy
of the state.
In order to determine the exportability of Fellhauer it
was necessary to undertake a cursory survey of the statute
books of the surrounding states in relation to the authority
11. Interview with Raphael J. Moses, Attorney at Law, Boulder, Colorado, October 17, 1969. There is a letter on file in the Wyoming Land & Water Law
Review office dated October 20, 1969, reaffirming Mr. Moses' views on this
legislation. Mr. Moses is a noted attorney in the area of water law for
Colorado.
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given to those responsible for the administration of the water

law of the several states.
Prior to 1969 Colorado had little or no procedure for the
state engineer to follow. He merely was given the blanket authority to adopt such rules and regulations and issue such orders as he deemed necessary to carry out his duties. The result, of course, was Fellhauer,and a new water code.
Montana" and New Mexico appear to follow this pre1969 liberality of Colorado in conferring broad powers upon
the water authorities with, again, little or no procedure
stated. New Mexico excels in its liberalism toward the state
engineer."
The statutes of Idaho, 1 4 Utah, 5 and Wyoming appear, to
some degree or another, to contain either procedures to be
followed by the water authority, or to contain the substance of
Fellhaueralready. Wyoming is especially noted here because
of the parallelism found in this state's statutes.
The state engineer of Wyoming has promulgated no rules
or regulations in this area of water law, none are in the making at this time, nor are any expected to be formulated in the
12. REv. CODE MONT. § 89-132.1 (Supp. 1969). This section is included in the
"Montana Water Resources Act of 1967" and states that the director of the
state water conservation board shall have power to:
"Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to effect the purpose of
this act."
It is interesting to note the similarity of language to that used in Fellhauer
-the exception being that the latter commands promulgation.
13. N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 75-2-8 (1953). This section states: "The state engineer may adopt regulations and codes to implement and enforce any
provision of any law administered by him and may issue orders necessary
to implement his decisions and to aid him in the accomplishment of his
duties. In order to accomplish its purpose, this provision is to be liberally
construed.
H. Any regulation, code, or order issued by the state engineer is presumed to be in proper implementation of the provisions of the water
laws administered by him."
14. IDAHO CODE § 42-237a (Supp. 1969). This section states that the state
reclamation engineer is empowered:
"To supervise and control the exercise and administration of all rights
hereafter acquired to the use of ground waters and in the exercise of
this power he may by summary order, prohibit or limit the withdrawal
of water from any well during any period that he determines that water
to fill any water right in said well is not there available."
15. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-10-19, as amended (1969). This section states that
the director of the division of water resources is to: "Make studies, investigations, and plans for the full development and utilization and promotion of
the water and power resources of the state, including preliminary surveys,
stream gauging, examinations, tests, and other estimates ... "

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss1/6

6

Ahlstrom: Water Law - Procedure of State Engineer in Closing down Wells Hel

1970

CASE NOTES

immediate future.1 6 However, the legislature has recognized
the possibility of circumstances arising similar to those found
in Fellhauerin connection with a river such as the Arkansas,1 7
and has provided for the procedure to be followed and the
corrective controls to be adopted by the state engineer in such
event. Section 41-132 of the Wyoming Statutes provides
that:
(a) The state engineer may, on his own motion,
and shall on the petition of twenty appropriators or
of one-tenth of the appropriators of water from a
critical area, cause a hearing to be held.. .to determine whether the underground water in such area is
adequate for the needs of all appropriators of underground water in such area. (Provisions are made at
this point for publication of notice of the meeting in
area newspapers.) If the state engineer shall find
after the hearing, and after receiving the advice of
the district advisory board, that the underground
water in that area is insufficient for all of the appropriators, he may by order adopt one or more of
the following corrective controls:
(1) He may close the critical area to any further
appropriation of underground water....
(2) He may determine the permissible total
withdrawal of underground water in the critical area
for each day, month or year, and, insofar as may be
reasonably done, he shall apportion such permissible
total withdrawal among the appropriators holding
valid rights to the underground water in the critical
area in accordance with the relative dates of priority
of such rights.
(3) If he finds that withdrawals by junior appriators have a material or adverse effect upon the
supply available for and needed by senior appropriators, he may order such junior appropriators to
cease or reduce withdrawals forthwith.
16. Interview with Jack Gage, Jr., State Attorney General's Office, October 15,
1969. In addition, Mr. Gage indicated that there are no critical areas in
Wyoming at this time in relation to the problems presented in Fellhauer.
17. Wyo. STAT. § 41-133 (1957).
This section states: "Where underground
waters and the waters of surface streams are so interconnected as to constitute in fact one source of supply, priorities of rights to the use of all
such interconnected waters shall be correlated and such single schedule of
priorities shall relate to the whole common water supply. The state engineer
may by order adopt any of the corrective controls specified in section 17 of
this act (§ 41-132)."
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(4) If he finds that cessation or reduction of
withdrawals by junior appropriators will not result
in proportionate benefits to senior appropriators,
he may require and specify a system of rotation of
use of underground water in the critical area.1 8
Paragraph (b) of this same section goes on to state that
the engineer will encourage agreements among appropriators
as to withdrawals, apportionment, rotation or proration of
the common supply of underground water.
A 1969 amendment 19 was passed by the legislature in
order to broaden these controls in order to permit the engineer
to issue such orders "whether in a critical area or not."
It is also interesting to note that to a degree Section 41132 contains all three of the requirements for constitutionality
which the Fellhauercourt said would be prerequisite to valid
well regulation."0 From the standpoint of water law, at
least, it would appear that this state has adequately provided
for Fellhauerwithout having a "Fellhauer case." And from
an administrative law standpoint, it would appear that the
provisions for a hearing, the added advice of a district advisory board, and, subsequently, a decision by the state engineer,
would reduce the chances of "arbitrary and capricious" conduct on the part of the engineer to minute proportions.
As noted previously, the Fellhauercourt based its reversal
on the arbitrary and capricious conduct on the part of the
division engineer, which resulted in the violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and of the due process clause of the state
constitution. Section 9-276.32(c) of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act 2 sets forth in its provision for court
review of administrative actions that the court must determine, among other things, whether "the decision or other
agency action is arbitrary, capricious or characterized by
abuse of discretion." And, in this state an agency is so defined as to encompass the state engineer.22
18. WYo. STAT. § 41-132 (1957).
19. WYO. STAT. § 41-128 (1957), as amended, Wyo. STAT § 41-128 (1969).
20. Fellhauer v. People, supra note 2, at 993.
21.

WYo. STAT. §§ 9-276.19-.33

(Supp. 1969).

"'Agency'
This section states:
22. WYO. STAT. § 9-276.19 (Supp. 1969).
means any authority, bureau, board, commission, department, division, officer or employee of the state, a county, a municipality or other political
subdivision of the state, except the state legislature and the judiciary."
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As has been noted, "it is evident that the primary concern of the American legal profession and the judiciary has
been to establish a meaningful concept of due process of law
with reference to administrative proceedings, thereby protecting the citizens under the jurisdiction of administrative
agencies."23 Fellhauer serves to represent and reaffirm on
a more localized basis the settled proposition that "Congress
intended that administrative housekeeping regulations should
bow to constitutional supremacy,"" and all concerned would
do well to pay homage to its dictates, to the extent Fellhauer
may affect the constitutionality of present procedures followed.
Kenneth Culp Davis, in his new book, DiscretionaryJustice, states that the greatest and most frequent injustice occurs
at the discretion end of the scale, where rules and principles
provide little or no guidance, where emotions of deciding officers may affect what they do, where political or other favoritism may influence decisions, and where the imperfections of
human nature are often reflected in the choices made.2 5
In Fellhauer,as emphasized by the minority opinion, the
engineer shut down the wells only after an investigation revealed that such action was necessary to protect the rights of
senior appropriators. However, being unable to subsequently
produce and fully explain the precepts of such plan utilized
by him, the procedure was denounced as arbitrary and capricious, and ,therefore, invalid. This case undoubtedly will
serve as persuasive authority for the proposition that an engineer may still exercise the discretion necessary to perform his
duties adequately, but he would be well-advised to establish
uniform procedures, or follow procedure established by statute, and then be able to account for his actions as being under
such procedure and thereby establish the validity of the same.
In conclusion, it is evident that both the Colorado Supreme Court in Fellhauer,and the Colorado legislature in its
affirmation of said case, had as their ultimate goal a maximum
use of the groundwater of the state without affectation of
individual rights. This is a worthy goal ,and one hopefully to
23. WOLL, ADMINISTRAT vE LAW 21 (1963).
24. United States v. C. 0. Mason, Inc., 51 C.C.P.A. 107 (1964).
25. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969). See preface at v.
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be accomplished by all concerned states. But, as is evidenced
by the Wyoming Statutes, this may well be accomplished without placing an undue burden on the state engineer to, in effect,
set down complex, detailed working rules and regulations in
advance of any action taken by him. This is especially true
when such rules are practically incapable of formulation, for
all practical purposes, due to the very substance and nature
of the element sought to be regulated and controlled. It is conceivable that the majority of state engineers are competent,
carry out their duties in the best interest of all parties concerned, and, therefore, are ably qualified to rule fairly on a
case by case basis according to the dictates of the respective
state legislatures. It should be deemed sufficient that the procedure established by statute is followed, and, all things being
equal it should follow that the enactments under such statutes
would be valid. Fellhaureis, therefore exportable to the surrounding states to the degree that its dictates and caveats have,
or have not been, pronounced by the respective state legislatures and the water authorities under them.
BERT AHLSTROM
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